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This  session  on  energy  and  countless  others  at  other confer-
ences  and  workshops  are  manifestations  of  the  profound  increase
in  attention  devoted  to  energy  matters  since  the  energy  crisis  of
1973-74.  Up to that time.  the country had  been proceeding  blythly
on  a  path of steady,  4 per  cent  per year growth  in  consumption  of
low cost, abundant energy.  A few brave souls were expressing con-
cern  about  the  national  energy  situation.  M.  K.  Hubbert  already
was  contending  that  we  were  nearing the  zenith  of the petroleum
era,  some research  on  energy  policy and energy outlook was  under-
way  at a few  isolated  locations,  and  the  Congress  was  holding  oc-
casional  hearings  on  energy  policy.  But  the  public  at  large  and
most policy makers were completely  oblivious  to the possibility that
the United  States  would  encounter  any  difficulty  in continuing  to
supply ever increasing energy demands.
There were  a few  disquieting precursors  to  the crisis  of  1973-
74.  But  they  caught  the  attention  of  few  people  until  suddenly
there were shortages.  Then serious questions were raised about the
possibility  of  getting  fuel  to  heat  homes,  to  power  tractors,  or to
fuel industrial processes.
The  reaction  was  as  one  might  expect  in  a  "crisis"  situation.
The  federal  government  put  things  on  "war  time"  footing  with
mandatory  allocation  of  the  available  supplies  to  protect  essential
functions  and to prevent  panic  and breakdown  of the nation's  econ-
omy.  Price controls were instituted wherever they had not already
been in force in order to prevent profiteering.  A search was launch-
ed for the enemy in this war that had been thrust upon us.  Several
likely culprits  were guickly  identified.  Since the  crisis  commenced
when the embargo was  imposed, the Arabs were quickly  singled out
and blamed for our energy miseries.  But the embargo affected such
a small  fraction of our oil  supply that it was thought  someone  else
must be  involved.  The  oil  companies  also  were  charged  with  with-
holding  supplies  in  order  to  create  a  crisis  situation  that  would
make it easier for them to raise  prices,  set aside  environmental  re-
strictions,  and  generally get their  way in the country.  But a more
thorough investigation seemed to indicate that the petroleum indus-
try was guilty only of a little "war time" profiteering.
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ation returned to some semblance of normalcy.  But everything was
not  the  same.  The  petroleum  industry  was  regulated  to  a  much
greater extent than it ever had been before,  prices for energy  were
much  higher  and  still  climbing, and  there  was  a lingering sense  of
profound  uneasiness  about the prospects  for pleasant tranquility  in
the  country's energy future.
Recent  developments  tend  to  confirm  the  unattractiveness  of
the energy supply options available  to  the nation.  The natural  gas
system  is  showing signs  of  increasing stress  and  inability  to cope
with  demands.  Alaskan  oil  is going  to  be  much more  costly  than
originally anticipated.  Nuclear  power is under even more criticism
than  it was four years  ago.  The break-even  price for recovery  of
oil  from  shale  seems  to  be  always  staying  one  step out of  reach.
Vast conversion  to  coal  is hindered  by  several  environmental  prob-
lems.
The  difficulties  of  energy  supply  expansion  are  discouraging
enough to cause a gradual shift of attention to the other side of the
demand/supply  equation.  Maybe  it would  be  easier  to  reduce  de-
mand  than  to push  through the  steps necessary  to expand  supply.
Maybe  it would  be better to think of demand  growth  as the enemy
rather than  those  who control  supplies.  Increasingly,  policy  mak-
ers,  energy analysts,  and  the general  public  are  interested  in  con-
sidering  whether  something  can  and  should  be  done  about  the
growth in demand for energy.
Past, Present, and Future Demands for Energy
Consumption  of  energy in  the United  States has been  increas-
ing at an average rate of about  3.5 per cent per year during the past
100  years.  It is  now at a  level  of  about  80  quadrillion BTU's  per
year.  The regularity  of  the  growth  rate and  the fact that  it has
closely followed  economic growth, as measured by real gross nation-
al product,  have  led  to  a common  assumption  that energy demand
will continue  to grow  as long as the national  economy continues to
grow.  In fact,  there has been  considerable  tendency  to simply as-
sume that energy consumption  would continue to grow at historical
rates regardless  of what else happens.
The urge  to  know what  the future  holds  for energy demands
has  led  to a large  number  of forecasts,  using  different  methodolo-
gies, and  yielding widely different  estimates of what future energy
consumption  will be.  The simplest approach  is  to extrapolate  past
trends in growth  of energy consumption.  Most experts  in the busi-
ness  up  to  1973  foretold  the  energy  future  by  drawing  curves  on
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seemed  to work  pretty well  from  1955  to  1974,  but  there are  seri-
ous  questions  about  its  validity  for  longer  projections  or for  pro-
jection  in times  when  fundamental  changes  are  taking  place.  At-
tackers  of extrapolations  often  make  use of the debate tactic of re-
ductio  ad absurdim  in an application  that might be called  "extendio
ad labsurdlim."  For  example,  electricity  growth  at  7  per  cent
per year rate that was common  in the 1960's and  early 1970's would
result in a 1000-fold  increase in demand by the end of  100 years.
Extrapolations  of  energy  growth  rates  are  also  attacked  for
being  unnecessarily  simplistic.  After  all,  energy  demand  doesn't
just happen.  It results from growth  in basic economic components,
such  as  households,  incomes,  and  industrial  production  on the  one
hand, and  the use of  energy  for personal  or business  purposes.  So
recent energy forecasts  have  usually  used either composite  projec-
tion  by  energy  end-use  categories  or  some  form  of  econometric
analysis  and forecasting technique.
The  more  sophisticated  projections  tend  to  agree that  energy
consumption is not likely to grow as rapidly from now to the end of
the century  as  it did  during the period  from  1950  to  1975.  Trend
extrapolations  are  apparently  over-estimating  even  before  they
reach  obviously  absurd  levels.
The differences among econometrically  derived forecasts  of en-
ergy  demand  arise  mostly  because  of  differences  of  opinion  about
what will be the future levels for certain key consumption rates that
enter  into the forecasts.
The  public  and  private  debate  over which  demand  forecasts  is
most appropriate  often  becomes  quite  heated.  The reason  is that
the forecasts  are the basics for long-run plans for constructing en-
ergy supply facilities.  High demand forecasts mean that we should
begin now to plan for much larger systems  in  15 to 20  years.  This
makes  energy  suppliers  feel  good  about  their  company's  growth
prospects.  Also, erring on the side of  over-capacity  has certain ad-
vantages for a  supplier who  is  serving  customers  on demand.  The
environmentalists  want  the  opposite  because  it  means  that fewer
plants will  be  planned  and,  hopefully,  fewer will  be  built.
Reducing  the Growth of  Energy Demand
The  idea  of  taking  deliberate  action  to  decrease  the  rate  of
growth  in energy demand  was first put forward  in specific terms  in
the  Ford  Foundation's  Energy  Policy  Project.  Their  preliminary
report was  given a timely  release  in  1974  and immediately  received
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scenarios  of the future:  (1)  historical growth  led to continued  sup-
ply  difficulties,  (2)  technical  fix scenario  would  employ  those  de-
mand  reducing  measures  that could cut  energy consumption  with-
out affecting our standard  of  living,  (3)  a zero energy growth  sce-
nario  included  more conservation  to the extent of  some sacrifice of
level  of living  (from  projected  levels,  not  current)  and  changes  in
lifestyle.
Opponents  of  the Ford Foundation  study  claimed  that its zero
energy  growth  scenario  in particular  was  unrealistic  and  undesir-
able.  However,  the  idea of  taking deliberate  action  to  reduce  the
energy  consumption  growth  rate has continued  to receive consider-
ation and backing.
The Energy Policy  and  Conservation  Act of  1975 gave  a  small
boost toward consideration  of the demand side.  A potentially larger
push has  come from President Carter's  Energy Message  which  re-
ferred to energy conservation as the "cornerstone"  of his policy. His
subsequent  proposals  to  Congress  for action  included  a number  of
measures aimed explicitly at the goal of reducing the rate of growth
in demand  for energy.
Energy demand  reduction  is now generally  referred to as ener-
gy conservation,  in what seems at first to be a misnomer.  However,
further reflection reveals  that there are some  close parallels  to the
soil, forest and nature conservation movements of the 1930's,  1940's
and 1950's.  As in the earlier movements,  it is now argued that there
are  unused  opportunities  for  reducing  energy  consumption  and
hence  conserving  resources  by  slowing  the  depletion  of  those  re-
sources.
The  basis  for arguing that there  are opportunities  for saving
energy and also saving money is of particular interest to economists.
Neo-classical  economics  generally  assumes  that  consumers  and
businessmen  will  constantly  adjust  their  use  of  inputs,  such  as
energy,  so  as  to  maximize  satisfaction  if a  household,  or  income
if a business.  Advocates argue that energy conservation  opportuni-
ties have been overlooked  because  some measures have  only recent-
ly been discovered to have widespread applicability and the word has
not yet reached  all potential beneficiaries.
Price distortions faced  by the energy user can  have the effect
of  delaying  conservation.  Energy  pricing  regulations  have  long
been designed  to protect customers from price gouging or profiteer-
ing  by  energy  suppliers.  Among  regulated  utilities  it  has  been
contended  that  this  policy  has  caused  utilities  to  convert  from
the  normal  profit-maximizing  behavior  to  pursuit  of  maximum
27investment  in order  to have  the largest  possible  base  for  applying
their allowable rate of return.
Adoption  of  profitable  conservation  measures  also  can  be  de-
layed  by prices  for inputs  and  devices  that  save  energy  that are
more  expensive  to the  energy user than are comparable  inputs for
use in energy supply.  The cost of capital for investment  is a case in
point.  Energy  consumers  (i.e., potential  conservers)  often  have to
pay interest rates for capital to invest in insulation or conservation
equipment that are significantly  higher than rates  paid for capital
to be invested in energy supply.
Lastly, individual  energy consumers  are not likely  to take into
account broader social costs and benefits of their actions.  Environ-
mental costs  and the  social  costs  of depleting  scarce  resources  are
two important side effects of energy consumption.  Past experience
with  soil  conservation  and  other  similar  programs  indicates  that
only rarely will an individual voluntaritly accept individual  responsi-
bility for these social costs.
The  biggest  question  about  potential  energy  conservation
savings  is whether  acceptable  policies  can  actually  bring about the
adoption of the identified conservation measures.  So far, very little
has been done that would overcome the information  gaps, price and
cost  distortions,  and  other  hindrances  to  adoption  of  conservation
measures.  Therefore,  we  cannot  expect  that a  large  share  of  the
potential savings  will actually be realized with continuation of pres-
ent policies.  Policy  changes  aimed  at removing or overcoming  the
impediments  could  bring actual  energy  demands  more  closely  into
line with what would  be an optimal  level of  usage.  However,  even
with  all  plausible  policies  (short  of  mandatory  police  power)  we
believed that adoption would cut savings realized  to about one-third
of the maximum potential.
Actions to bring about more efficient energy use include policies
to correct  the problems  that cause  over-use  of energy  in the  first
place  and policies that induce or even force energy users  to change
to a publicly preferred pattern of energy  use.
Correction  of  price distortions  is  also  important.  Economists
are particularly  insistent  about  the need  for pricing energy  at full
marginal cost so that energy  consumers  will  take  into account  the
full cost impact of any  energy using choices  that they are tempted
to  make.  To  economists,  the arguments  for marginal  cost pricing
are totally convincing  and there are ample opportunities  for correc-
tions in the energy system.  For example,  federal  regulations  hold
the  price  of  oil  and  natural  gas to  less  than  the  marginal  cost  of
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electricity  at  below  marginal  cost  to  at least  some  if not  all  cus-
tomers,  and  environmental  and  social  costs  are  seldom  added  to a
customer's bill.  Non-economists,  however, find it extremely difficult
to believe  that  we could  possibly be  made  better off by further  in-
creasing energy prices that seem already to be too high.
The difficult  task faced  by advocates  of  marginal  cost  pricing
for energy  is  to convince  the public  that they  will  be  better off on
balance if they pay higher prices for energy.  The key is, of course,
that revenues  in  excess of average cost be returned to the public in
some form or other.  Economists  believe  that it matters  little how
the excess revenues  are distributed.  The public thinks otherwise.
The  third  "corrective"  approach  is  to  provide  incentive  pay-
ments  to  adopters  of conservation  measures.  These  can  be partly
justified  on the grounds  of offsetting  various disincentives  to con-
serve.  Actually,  this is  a very  popular approach  which  seems  des-
tined for more widespread  use,  especially  in the form of tax credits
for part of energy conservation  expenses.  The  reason for its popu-
larity  seems  to  be  simply  that  everyone  loves  a  handout.  Closer
scrutiny  reveals  it  to  be  a  rather  ineffective  approach  affecting
only investment  choices, not decisions  about behavior such  as ther-
mostat settings.  In addition,  subsidies tend to be costly per unit of
change  actually  obtained  since  the  subsidy  must be  paid  to  those
who would have adopted anyway.
Policies that make capital available  to potential adopters of en-
ergy  conservation  measures  at terms comparable  to those  faced  by
energy  suppliers  could help to  correct  a disparity  that now  exists.
Low interest  loans, guaranteed  loans, and loans available  for longer
periods  would  all  help  alleviate  situations  where  businesses  or
households  are  deterred  by capital  shortages  from  making  invest-
ments that could yield energy savings worth  several times  as much
as the required investment.
Policies  that  change  operating  rules,  such  as  building  codes,
also  can  serve  a  corrective  function.  Requirements  for excessive
lighting and ventilation  are  one  case  in point  where  a rule  change
could permit conservation  to take place.  More often,  however, rules
and regulations  are  used  to require what  is collectively  determined
to  be  the  "right thing  to  do."  Insulation  requirements  for  new
buildings,  efficiency  standards  for automobiles  and  appliances,  and
speed  limits  are  all  examples  of  regulation  "for  our  own  good."
Surprisingly, this approach  tends to be more favored than the alter-
natives that try to bring about change  while  still leaving  the final
choice  up  to  the  individual.  The  popular  backing  for  rules  that
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policy  that will work for sure  since  it depends  on public  compliance
with  the law  rather than on uncertain voluntary response.
The  ultimate  in directed  allocation  is  rationing.  Results  of  a
large household  survey that we  conducted  indicate  that many more
people  favor  rationing  than  would  approve  of  taxes  to  discourage
heavy  energy consumtpion.  Past experience  indicates  that ration-
ing works  best  in an emergency  situation.  It is very doubtful  that
it would  wear well  if adopted  as a long-run solution  to energy  prob-
lems.
Public  policy educators  can  play  an important  role  in the over-
all  deliberations  about  energy  policy choices.  I  see three  principal
areas  where your input can  be particularly  helpful.
Education  of the public as to the resource  depletion  issue would
provide a useful base for decisions about how important it is to push
energy conservation,  even to the point where the cost of the conser-
vation  measure  exceeds  the  present  value  of  the  energy  that  is
saved.  The American  public  is widely divided on this issue at pres-
ent.
Communication  of a general  perspective  for evaluating  conser-
vation  opportunities  relative  to  the  alternatives  of  energy  supply
could  also  help  to  settle  a number  of  debates  that have  grown  up
over issues such as power plant construction,  coal mining, and so on.
At present, there  is no agreed-upon  basis for comparing  such diver-
gent  choices.  The  understanding  of  public  choice  processes  is  in-
creasing,  and  public policy  educators  could  make  a  substantial  con-
tribution  by using that and other concepts to lead to a resolution of
energy  issues.
Public  policy  educators  could  help  to  develop  innovative  insti-
tutional  arrangements for implementing desirable  energy  policy ac-
tions.  All  too often,  policies  are agreed to in principle  but dropped
because  no  one  can  see a way  to implement them through  existing
or politically feasible  institutional structures.  Institutional innova-
tion,  in that case,  is  an extremely  valuable input  and one that pub-
lic policy educators  may be  especially skilled  at supplying.
A  final  note  of  caution  is  in  order.  -The  stakes  in  energy
policy deliberations  are large and there are many opposing points of
view  about  what  should  be  done.  The  public  policy  educator  who
enters  this  arena  should  be  prepared  for attack  and  criticism,  re-
gardless  of  the role  that he plays.
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